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1 Introduction
The main objective of an audit of financial statements is to enable the auditor
to express an opinion about whether the financial statements are prepared,
in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial report-
ing framework (ISA 200 2009). To achieve this, audits should be planned and
performed with an attitude of professional scepticism recognizing that circum-
stances may exist causing financial statements to be materially misstated ISA
200 (2009). Professional scepticism is a concept of crucial importance in audit
practice and an intrinsic part of the audit process (Anugerah et al., 2011).
However, a fundamental prerequisite for its success is the professional account
to be compliant with the principles of integrity, objectivity, professional compe-
tence and due care, confidentiality, and professional behaviour (IESBA 2011).
Unfortunately, professional scepticism can be affected by several factors
which is turn might degrade the performance of the auditing process. Typical
examples include the cases where an auditor does not appropriately evaluate
the results of the audit process leading to failed reporting, or due to self-interest
it’s judgement has been affected. Advocacy and familiarity threats where an
auditor can either promote a client’s opinion or due to a close relationship can
act with sympathy may also affect audit quality. These threats can be further
exaggerated under long-term interactions between auditors and small clients
(Li 2010).
To eliminate these threats or mitigate them below a specific threshold,
several solutions have been proposed in the literature of business economics.
However, the majority of the existing approaches have studied the impact of
these threats on the audit quality segmentally1. For example, the impact of
ethics on audit quality has been studied by Shaub and Lawrence (1996) where
it is shown that ethics has a positive relationship to auditors’ professional
skepticism. For an excellent review on the subject the reader is referred to
(Nelson 2009). Other studies, use logistic regression models to test the rela-
tion between audit firm tenure and audit quality (Carcello and Nagy 2004;
Ghosh and Moon 2005; Fargher et al., 2008; Jenkins and Velury 2008; Jackson
et al., 2008; Stanley and DeZoort 1996; Corbella et al., 2015; Garcia-Blandon
and Ma Argiles 2015) and it is argued that both the knowledge to identify and
the ability to develop processes to address audit issues rely on professional
maturity (McCoy et al., 2011). Another research area tries to develop mecha-
nisms that are mainly focused on evidence gathering for detecting fraud using
statistical sampling theory (Matsamura and Tucker 1992; Bolton 2002). To
the authors’ opinion, an efficient decision making framework that could assist
the auditors to identify, evaluate, and mitigate fraudulent financial reporting
should jointly address all the threats mentioned above. In addition to this,
it should be able to determine the optimal audit plan and provide reasonable
1 A review on the factors affecting the quality of the audit process is provided by Sutton
(1993)
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assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole are free from material
misstatements.
One of the first research efforts on the subject has been recently analyzed
by Anugerah et al., (2011), where the method of statistical hypothesis test-
ing is used to evaluate the relation between ethics, expertise, and experience
in the auditors’ professional scepticism. However, a critical issue that is not
analyzed is how the interactions between auditors and clients affect the be-
havior of the auditee firm. Motivated by the pioneer paper of Fellingham and
Newmam (1985) researchers started to analyze the interactions between au-
ditors and clients in such a way that the auditor’s strategy has an impact
on the behavior of the auditee. Specifically, in this scheme, the client has the
option to choose between high and low effort to eliminate misstatements in
financial reports, while the auditor may select between high and low audit
effort to detect misstatements. Inspired by this approach significant research
has been carried out on the fraud detection problem employing game theory
(Cook et al., 1997; Coates et al., 2002; Patterson and Noel 2003; Eleftheriou
2013; Fischbacher and Stefani 2007; Laitinen and Laitinen 2015; Carpenter
2007; Bowlin et al., 2009; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Anastasopoulos and
Asteriou 2013; Anastasopoulos et al., 2013).
Unlike previous approaches, in the current paper a holistic framework is
proposed to address the problem of fraud deterrence and detection taking into
consideration fundamental principles and threats that may affect the perfor-
mance of an audit process. Based on evidence from social psychology principles
that are used to model the impact of auditor’s tenure on the auditee firm, as
well as on the outcomes of statistical sampling theory on audit quality, a math-
ematical model based on game theory is proposed to combat the limitations of
the existing approaches. The proposed game-theoretic scheme considers two
players, the auditor and the client. The client has the choice either to commit
fraud or not while the auditor has the choice to adopt an audit plan that is
based either on a basic set of audit procedures or on an extended set of risk as-
sessment procedures. Factors such as familiarity and experience that severely
affect the outcome of the audit process are analytically modeled based on
evidence from social psychology.
The present study extends the literature in several ways. First of all, a
unified decision theory model is developed to jointly confront the basic threats
that are involved in an auditing process and provide reasonable assurance for
that the financial statements are free from material misstatement. This is
achieved by analyzing the dynamics of auditing strategies over time under
varying payoffs using game theory. Second, the possible equilibrium points are
investigated. It is proven that the auditing/fraud detection game between:
a) two new engagement parties; has unique mixed strategy equilibrium,
b) an experienced auditor and a client; has unique pure strategy equilibrium
that is predominately affected by the auditor increased abilities to detect
frauds
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c) two old engagement parties; the audit process switches to new pure strategy
equilibrium that is governed by sympathy.
Third, it provides a closed form solution for the optimal auditor’s period re-
placement. The results obtained comply with the International Federation of
Accountants (IFAC) Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants that requires
the key audit partner to be rotated after a predefined period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the impact of
auditor’s tenure on the client specific knowledge acquisition and intimacy are
modeled based on social psychology principles. A generalized version of the
audit/fraud detection game using classic game theory is presented in Section
3, whereas a set of risk assessment procedures together with the experimental
validation of the proposed scheme is provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
During the last years there has been an increasing demand for improving audit
quality and questions were raised about how this objective can be achieved.
Proponents of mandatory auditor rotation argue that audit quality is dimin-
ished with long auditor tenure. For example, Vanstraelen (2000) discovered a
negative relationship between auditor tenure and the probability of qualified
opinions. For this reason, considering the possible negative repercussions of
long term services engagements on auditor independence, regulators have cor-
related the audit quality with auditor tenure (Azizkhani et al 2007). Typical
examples include the standards and guidelines of the IFAC and the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in Australia that require the rotation of the key audit
partner after a predefined period, normally no more than seven years and five
years, respectively (IESBA 2011).
On the other hand, the opponents of mandatory rotation theory state that
there are no convincing empirical evidence from the auditing research litera-
ture that justifies these actions. They also argue that audit quality is improved
over time, since for longer audit engagements, the auditor acquires an in-depth
understanding on activities and relevant internal control systems of the audited
entity (Azizkhani et al 2007). For example, Carcello and Nagy (2004) found
empirical evidence that fraudulent financial reporting occurs in the early years
of an auditor-client relationship quite often. The same conclusions are drawn
by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), who identified that reporting failures oc-
cur more often in the first five years of an auditor-client relationship. Similarly,
the AICPA documents allegations of audit failures to be increased almost by
factor three for first- or second-year audits. Focusing on the user perspective,
Ghosh and Moon (2005) found evidence that investors and rating agencies
rely on audited financial reports more strongly as auditor tenure increases.
Moreover, Myers et al., (2003) found extreme accounting choices to be con-
strained more strongly under a high auditor’s tenure. Finally, Mansi et al.,
(2004) reported that costs of debt decrease with auditor tenure.
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However, to the authors’ opinion this is partial justification for the view
that auditing tenure and rotation theories are not conflicting, but rather com-
plementary ways of understanding, planning and performing an audit of fi-
nancial statements. In the following sections the impact of auditor’s tenure on
the client specific knowledge acquisition and intimacy are modeled based on
social psychology principles. Then, based on game theory a unified framework
is proposed that identifies the optimal auditing strategies to obtain reason-
able assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material
misstatement.
3 Modeling Learning and Sympathy
3.1 Auditors Skills Acquisition Curves
Intrinsic to the concept of skill acquisition is the notion that performance
quality improves over time, that is, people are becoming better as they persist
in the activity under examination (Green 2003). This observation is closely
related to the arguments espoused by the opponents of mandatory rotation
theory who believe that audit quality improves over time. The fact that skills
develop over time raises an obvious question about the course of skill acquisi-
tion, especially in auditing. To this end, the accurate modeling of the course
of that improvement is a key issue to be addressed.
Despite the vast body of literature in the area of knowledge acquisition,
especially in cognitive and motor skill development (Lane 1987; Mazur and
Hastie 1978; Newell and Rosenbloom 1981; Nanda and Adler 1977), the rele-
vant research in auditing is limited (Earley 2001; Dillard and Roberts 2010).
In one such study, Beck and Wu (2006) modeled the auditors learning process
through a recursive relation of the form: nt+1 = nt+κ. where nt denotes audi-
tors knowledge about the clients business model at time period t. This formula
states that, given nt, the auditors knowledge about the evolution of the clients
business model will be increased in the period t+ 1 by κ leading to improved
audit quality. An important aspect is that this continual improvement in au-
dit quality is characterized by a “diminishing returns” effect in which during
the initial practice trials large gains are observed, whereas after a successful
number of practice trials the size of the increment in performance quality is
reduced (Green 2003). The large body of research on acquisition of cognitive
and motor skills has centered on two distinct families of curves, the exponential
and power functions, both of which are consistent with the general pattern of
decelerating performance increments mentioned above.
In the present study, knowledge acquisition in auditing is related to the
detection probability of a fraud and follows the general exponential function
describing a learning curve like the dashed line of Fig. 1. A key assumption
is that, the probability of fraud detection converges to 1 as the number of
auditing periods tends to infinity. This is aligned with the studies of Beck and
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Fig. 1: Auditor’s skill acquisition and sympathy curves representing perfor-
mance improvements and closeness, respectively, over the course of practice
.
Wu (2006) where it is shown that under specific assumptions2 the auditor in
the long run will completely learn about the clients status. To mathematically
model this process, the following equation is considered:
pE(t) = 1− E0e−αLt (1)
where pE is a measure of performance quality i.e. detection probability of a
fraudulent reporting by an experienced auditor, E0 represents performance
level on the first practice trial, for example, the probability of failed audit
after the engagement of a new audit, e is the base of the natural logarithm
(or approximately 2.718), αL reflects the auditor’s learning ability in the new
environment, and t is the number of auditing periods.
3.2 Modeling Sympathy
According to biobehavioral psychologists, closeness gives people a greater
amount of confidence that they know their partner’s behavior which, in turn,
leads to a bias toward believing their partner’s behavior is truthful. This leads
to a lower rate of deception detection accuracy (Levine and McCornack 1992;
McCornack and Parks 1986; Stiff et al., 1992). In terms of auditing, this obser-
vation may lead to a deterioration of audit quality over time since the auditors
are gradually becoming less independent from the client firm. This is verified
2 It is assumed that the clients earnings distributions over time are identically and inde-
pendently distributed
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by Bazerman et al., (1997) where, for example, it is stated that “under cur-
rent institutional arrangements, it is psychologically impossible for auditors to
maintain their objectivity”. This closer relationship with the managers poten-
tially increases the risk of collusion and may prevent the auditors from making
objective decisions. This situation is referred to as Non-Independence (NI) and
may lead to biased auditor’s judgments in favor of their own and their client’s
interest (Bazerman et al., 1997).
These effects can be mathematically modeled by appropriately modifying
the exponential law of closeness suggested by Marshall (1992). Specifically, the
probability an auditor to report a detected fraud is related to the probability
of being Independent (I), pI , described through following equation:
pI(t) = I
∞ + (1− I∞) e−αIt (2)
In (2), αI is a parameter describing the auditor’s personal characteristics, t is
the social distance between the engagement parts that is related to the number
of auditing periods and I∞ is the probability an auditor being independent
after a large number of auditing periods. This probability depends on several
factors including the opportunities available to the auditor to generate future
revenues through the prospect of retaining the client, mental and body simi-
larity, attractiveness etc. The exact evaluation of this parameter is out of the
scope of the present work, however, for a detailed discussion on the subject,
along with evidence from laboratory tests the reader is referred to (Sally 2000).
4 Problem Formulation
4.1 Modeling Payoffs Functions
In this Section, the auditing/fraud detection problem is modeled using non-
cooperative game theory. This game belongs to the general class of coordina-
tion games in which all players involved can be benefited provided that they are
acting in a mutual consistent manner (Russel 1998). In the present study, two
types of players are considered that is, the auditor and the client. Throughout
the auditing process, the auditor needs to obtain reasonable assurance that
the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatements (ISA
240 2009). Misstatement in the financial statements can be caused either in-
advertently or intentionally (fraudulent reporting). Although standard audit
procedures can be effectively used to identify unintentionally caused material
misstatements, in some cases they can be proved inefficient for the detection
of misstatements caused by fraud. A possible solution to this problem is the
auditor to apply an extended set of risk assessment procedures. These proce-
dures can reduce the risks of misstatements resulting from fraudulent financial
reporting to an acceptable low level (ISA 315 2009). However, their main dis-
advantage is that they are more costly since they require additional auditing
effort.
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Fig. 2: The Two-Player Audit/Fraud Detection Game in extensive-form
.
Extending this rationale, the auditor can either adopt a Basic Audit (BA)
or an Extended Audit (EA) plan following the guidelines of ISA 315 (2009).
The auditor’s pure-strategy set can be defined as SA = {BA,EA}. On the
other hand, the client can either select to commit fraud (F ) or not (NF ).
In this case, the client’s pure-strategy set is SC = {NF,F}. At this point
it should be noted that that material misstatements due to inadvertent er-
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ror can be detected by both auditing procedures. However, intentional errors
(frauds) can be detected either by EA or by an experienced auditor who has
adopted BA. Specifically, if the auditor has remained for several auditing pe-
riods to the same auditee firm then, the learning process of the auditor may
lead to an increasing ability to detect material misstatements in the finan-
cial statements of the auditee. Therefore, it is very likely that frauds will be
detected by an experienced auditor, even if BA has been adopted. However,
an increase in tenure may result in increasing empathy between the engage-
ment parties (Fairchild 2007). As already mentioned, closeness gives people a
greater amount of confidence that they know their partner’s behavior which,
in turn, leads to a bias toward believing their partner’s behavior is truthful. In
terms of auditing, this observation may lead to a deterioration of audit quality
over time since the auditors are gradually becoming less independent from the
audited entity. Therefore, even if the financial statements of an auditee are
materially misstated, a sympathetic yet experienced auditor will be incapable
of interpreting this information as negative.
A graphical representation of the audit/fraud detection game between the
two parties is provided in Fig. 2, where two basic scenarios are observed:
a) If the client does not commit a fraud, the payoff for the auditor is −cEA
(−cBA) and for the client is rR (0) in case the auditor selects EA (BA).
It is clear that −cBA > −cEA since the cost of EA, namely cEA, is higher
that the cost cBA of BA due to additional auditing efforts. On the contrary,
an extended audit that will not reveal misstatements will improve client’s
reputation. Therefore, the client will receive a bonus reward, rR > 0.
b) If the client commits a fraud then, this incident may be detected either
by EA or by an experienced auditor who has adopted BA. The auditor
will then receive a bonus bA due to its successful efforts to unveil frauds.
Therefore, in the former case, the payoff for the auditor and the client
is −cEA + bA and rF − pD, while in the latter −cBA + bA and rF − pD,
respectively. It is clear that, −cEA + bA < −cBA + bA since EA is more
costly compared to BA due to additional auditing efforts. Furthermore, in
both cases, a penalty rF − pD (pD > rF ) will be imposed to the client.
Unfortunately, there are some cases in which frauds are not detected. If the
auditor does not have adequate experience to detect frauds, then due to the
failure of the auditing procedures to unveil frauds, the auditor will pay 
( < 0), as penalty, while the client will gain rF , where rF is the value of the
stolen assets. Similarly, if the auditor is not independent, frauds will not be
detected regardless of the auditing strategies employed. The client will again
receive a payoff rF while the auditor will pay as penalty −cEA+  or −cEA+ 
in case of EA or BA, respectively. The payoff matrices A, B for the auditor
and the client, respectively, are defined as follows:
A =
(
aNFBA a
F
BA
aNFEA a
F
EA
)
(3a)
B =
(
bNFBA b
F
BA
bNFEA b
F
EA
)
(3b)
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where akh denotes the payoff to the auditor and b
k
h the payoff to the client when
the auditor uses pure strategy h ∈ SA and the client pure strategy k ∈ SC .
Based on Fig. 2, these elements can be written in the following form:
aFBA = pI [pE (−cBA + bA) + (1− pE) (−cBA − )]− (cBA + ) (1− pI) (4a)
aFEA = pI(−cEA + bA) + (1− pI) (−cEA − ) (4b)
bFBA = pI [pE (rF − pD) + (1− pE) (rF )] + (rF ) (1− pI) (4c)
bFEA = pI(rF − pD) + (1− pI) (rF ) (4d)
Substituting (1)-(2) into (4a)-(4d) yields
aFBA(t) = −(cBA + ) + (bA + )pI(t)pE(t) (5a)
aFEA(t) = −(cEA + ) + (bA + )pI(t) (5b)
bFBA(t) = rF − pDpI(t)pE(t) (5c)
bFEA(t) = rF − pDpI(t) (5d)
From (5a)-(5d) it is observed that the payoffs for the auditor and the client
depend on pI(t) and pE(t), which, in turn, are functions of t. A graphical
representation of these equations, assuming that pD is much higher than rF ,
is provided in Fig. 3. In the lower part of Fig. 3, the payoffs for the engagement
parts are depicted for the ideal scenario where the probability an auditor being
independent after a large number of auditing periods is high. On the contrary,
in the upper part of Fig. 3, the same parameters are examined based on the
rational assumption that the probability of an auditor being independent in
the long run is low.
Depending on the time instant where the audit/fraud detection problem
is analyzed (Early, Mid or Late phase) the following observations are drawn
regarding the evolution of the payoffs for the auditor and the client over time:
1) Early Phase: During the early phase of the audit process (t → 0) the payoffs
for the auditor and the client, respectively, are given by
lim
t→0
aFBA(t) = −(cBA + ) + (bA + ) lim
t→0
pI(t)pE(t) = −cBA −  < 0 (6a)
lim
t→0
aFEA(t) = −(cEA + ) + (bA + ) lim
t→0
pI(t) = −cEA + bA > 0 (6b)
lim
t→0
bFBA(t) = rF − pD lim
t→0
pI(t)pE(t) = rF > 0 (6c)
lim
t→0
bFEA(t) = rF − pD lim
t→0
pI(t) = rF − pD < 0 (6d)
Given that, the psychological incentives for both parties are negligible, if
the client selects to commit a fraud, the payoff for the auditor in case EA is
adopted is positive since the audit process will turn out to be successful. On
the contrary, the payoff for the auditor in case BA is adopted is negative since
frauds will not be detected.
2) Mid Phase: During this phase of the audit process, the auditor has gained
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Fig. 3: Evolution of payoffs over time
significant experience on the auditee firm. Therefore, the probability for de-
tecting a fraud using BA is high (aFBA(t) > 0). This observation is illustrated
in Fig. 3a where it is seen that aFBA(t) is a concave function having it’s max-
imum at t0, whose value is determined from the solution of
∂aFBA(t)
∂t
∣∣∣
t=t0
= 0.
Similarly, bFBA(t) takes negative values due to the high probability of a BA to
unveil frauds. Again, using the second derivative test, it can be easily shown
that bFBA(t) is a convex function having it’s minimum at
∂bFBA(t)
∂t
∣∣∣
t=t0
= 0.
3) Late Phase: After a large number of auditing periods (t → +∞) the payoffs
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for the auditor and the client will converge to the following values
lim
t→+∞ a
F
BA(t) = −(cBA + ) + (bA + )I∞ (7a)
lim
t→+∞ a
F
EA(t) = −(cEA + ) + (bA + )I∞ (7b)
lim
t→+∞ b
F
BA(t) = rF − pDI∞ (7c)
lim
t→+∞ b
F
EA(t) = rF − pDI∞ (7d)
Based on I∞, two major cases are examined:
a) For high values of I∞, both bFEA(t) and b
F
BA(t) are negative because fraud-
ulent reporting will be always detected by an experienced and independent
auditor.
b) For low values of I∞, both bFEA(t) and b
F
BA(t) will be positive. This is
justified by the fact that due to biased auditor’s judgments, deliberate
misreporting will be not detected. As discussed in Bazerman et al., (1997),
this is the most common case since auditors may find psychologically im-
possible to remain impartial and objective.
4.2 Problem Solution
Based on the analysis presented in the previous section, it is deduced that
the audit process should be planed for entire horizon taking into account the
following propositions:
Proposition 1 The auditing/fraud detection game between two new engage-
ment parties has a single mixed strategy equilibrium.
Proof When a new audit engagement is accepted, the impact of auditor’s
tenure on independence is negligible. Therefore, based on (6b)-(6d) it may be
easily observed that the best response of the auditor to the strategies NF
and F is BA and EA, respectively, while the best response of the client to
the strategies BA and EA is F and NF , respectively. Therefore, a pair of
strategies in which each strategy is the best response compared to the other
one in that pair does not exist (Dutta 1999).
Even though the game has no pure strategy equilibria, it has a single mixed
strategy equilibrium. A mixed strategy for player i, i = A, C is a probability
distribution over his set Si of pure strategies (Fudenberg and Levin 1998).
Since the set Si, i = A, C is finite, any mixed strategy x and y for the
auditor and the client, respectively, may be represented as vector with their
hth coordinate, xh, yh denoting the probability assigned by the auditor and the
client to pure strategy h ∈ SA and h ∈ SC , respectively. It should be also noted
that xh, yh ≥ 0 and
∑
h∈SA xh = 1,
∑
h∈SC yh = 1. The expected payoffs of
the two players are denoted by uA(x,y) = x · Ay, and uC(x,y) = y · BTx
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and are given by:
uA(x,y) = xBA
[
aFBAyF + a
NF
BAyNF
]
+ xEA
[
aFEAyF + a
NF
EAyNF
]
(8a)
uC(x,y) = yF
[
bFBAxBA + b
F
EAxEA
]
+ yNF
[
bNFBAxBA + b
NF
EAxEA
]
(8b)
The auditor and the client choose xBA and yF that maximize (8a) and (8b),
respectively. Their first order conditions are:
∂uA
∂xBA
= aFBAyF + a
NF
BA (1− yF )− aFEAyF − aNFEA (1− yF ) = 0 (9a)
∂uC
∂yF
= bFBAxBA + b
F
EA (1− xBA)− bNFBAxBA − bNFEA (1− xBA) = 0 (9b)
Solving the set of equations (9a)-(9b) for yi and xi, respectively, the following
mixed strategy equilibrium is derived:
(x∗BA, x
∗
EA) =
(
δ
γ + δ
,
γ
γ + δ
)
(10a)
(y∗F , y
∗
NF ) =
(
α
α+ β
,
β
β + α
)
(10b)
where
α = aNFBA − aNFEA = −cBA − (−cEA) = cEA − cBA > 0 (11a)
β = aFEA − aFBA = + bA − (cEA − cBA) > 0 (11b)
γ = bNFBA − bFBA = −rF < 0 (11c)
δ = bFEA − bNFEA = rF − pD − rR < 0 (11d)
From this solution the following conclusions are drawn
a) It is verified that the game has no pure strategy equilibria since the prob-
abilities for the auditor and the client to select BA or EA and NF and F ,
respectively, always take values in the range (0, 1).
b) The probability for the auditor to select BA increases with δ and decreases
with γ. Recall that δ is a decreasing function of the penalty that is imposed
to the client when a fraudulent report is detected. δ also depends on the
reputation that a company earns in case that at the end of an extended
audit frauds are not detected by the auditor.
c) The probability for the client to select not to fraud increases with β, where
β depends on the bonus bA an auditor earns when a fraudulent report is
detected.
Proposition 2 During the mid phase, the auditing/fraud detection game be-
tween an experienced auditor and the client has a single pure strategy equi-
librium that is (x∗BA, y
∗
NF ) = (1, 1). This equilibrium is asymptotically sta-
ble in xBA, yNF ∈ Υ\{x∗BA, y∗NF } with Υ being a neighborhood region around
xBA = x
∗
BA, yNF = y
∗
NF .
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Proof After few auditing rounds, the auditor has gained significant experience
on the auditee firm. Therefore, the probability for detecting a fraud using
either BA or EA is high. However, since EA is more costly compared to BA
due to additional auditing efforts, the auditor will adopt BA. Algebraically,
this event is expressed through aFBA > a
F
EA and it is graphically illustrated in
the left part of Figs. 3a and 3b. Thus, the best response of the auditor to the
strategies NF and F is BA, respectively. On the other hand, the best response
of the client to the strategies EA and BA is NF since he knows a priori that
if he commits a fraud then this action will be detected.
To proof the second claim, the evolutionary dynamics of the auditing/fraud
detection game will be analyzed around the equilibrium (BA,NF ). The strate-
gies for both players evolve over time according to the replicator dynamics
system (Anastasopoulos and Asteriou 2013):
x˙BA =
⎡
⎣ ∑
k∈{NF,F}
akBAyk − uA(x,y)
⎤
⎦ xBA (12a)
y˙NF =
⎡
⎣ ∑
h∈{BA,EA}
bNFh xh − uC(x,y)
⎤
⎦ yNF (12b)
Equations (12a)-(12b) state that strategies offering higher payoff than aver-
age grow whereas strategies with lower payoff shrink. After some algebraic
manipulations, (12a)-(12b) take the following form:
x˙BA = xBAxEAF (t, yNF ) (13a)
y˙NF = yNFyFG (t, xBA) (13b)
where F(t, yNF ) = [−β(t) + (α(t) + β(t)) yNF ] and G(t, xBA) = [−δ(t) +
(γ(t) + δ(t)) xBA] with α(t), β(t), γ(t), δ(t) defined in the left part of (11a)-
(11d):
α(t) = cEA − cBA (14a)
β(t) = −(cEA − cBA) + (ba + )pI(t)(1− pE(t)) (14b)
γ(t) = −rF + pDpI(t)pE(t) (14c)
δ(t) = rF − rR − pDpI(t) (14d)
Then, the stability of the system (13a)-(13b) around the equilibrium point will
be examined. However, due to its non-linear time-varying nature techniques
based on Lyapunovs direct or indirect method are not sufficient for inferring
stability properties of the audit/fraud detection game. An alternative approach
is to infer asymptotic stability by examining the higher order derivatives of
Lyapunov functions using the time varying version of the following theorem
Butz (1999):
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Theorem 1 Consider the nonlinear system x˙ = f(t, x) and an m-vector func-
tion V(t, x) of the following form:
V(t, x) = [V1(t, x),V2(t, x), . . . ,Vm(t, x)]T (15)
whose time derivative V˙(t, x) along the solutions of x˙ = f(t, x) satisfies the
following differential inequality⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
V˙1(t, x)
V˙2(t, x)
...
˙Vm(t, x)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 1 · · · 0
0 0
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
−a0 −a1 · · · −am−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
V1(t, x)
V2(t, x)
...
Vm(t, x)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (16)
with a0 > 0 and aj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, ...,m−1. In addition, assume V˙(t, x∗) = 0 and
all the roots of the following characteristic equation are negative real numbers:
sm + am−1sm−1 + · · ·+ a1s+ a0 = 0. (17)
If V1(t, x) is positive definite function satisfying the following conditions:
V1(t, x∗) = 0,V1(t, x) > 0, ∀x ∈ Υ\{x∗}, (18)
then the equilibrium point x∗ is asymptotically stable.
A Lypapunov candidate function of the system (13a)-(13b) satisfying the above
properties is given by:
V1(t, xBA, yNF ) = δ1
(
xBA − x∗BA − x∗BA ln
(
xBA
x∗BA
))
(19)
+ δ2
(
yNF − y∗NF − y∗NF ln
(
yNF
y∗NF
))
with δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0. The time derivative of V1 can be written in the following
form:
V˙1(t, xBA, yNF ) = δ1
(
˙xBA − x∗BA
˙xBA
xBA
)
+ δ2
(
yNF − y∗NF
˙yNF
yNF
)
(20)
= δ1 (xBA − x∗BA)
˙xBA
xBA
+ δ2 (yNF − y∗NF )
˙yNF
yNF
Substituting (13a)-(13b) into (21) and setting x∗BA = 1, y
∗
NF = 1 yields:
V˙1(t, xBA, yNF ) = δ1 (xBA − 1)xEAF(t, yNF ) + δ2 (yNF − 1) yFG(t, xBA)
(21)
or
V˙1(t, xBA, yNF ) = −δ1 (1− xBA)2 F(t, yNF )− δ2 (1− yNF )2 G(t, xBA)(22)
= V2(t, xBA, yNF )
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In the next step, the first derivative of V2(t, xBA, yNF ) will be evaluated. After
straightforward algebra yields:
V˙2(t, xBA, yNF ) ≤ − δ1 (1− xBA)2
[
−2F2(t, yNF ) + F˙(t, yNF )
]
(23)
− δ2 (1− yNF )2
[
−2G2(t, xBA) + G˙(t, xBA)
]
Using (22) and (23), the following linear combination is evaluated:
V˙2 + a1V˙1 + a0V1 ≤ (24)
− δ1 (1− xBA)2
[
−2F2(t, yNF ) + F˙(t, yNF ) + a1F(t, yNF )− a0
]
− δ2 (1− yNF )2
[
−2G2(t, xBA) + G˙(t, xBA) + a1G(t, xBA)− a0
]
Theorem 1 holds when the right part of (24) equals to zero:
−2F2(t, yNF ) + F˙(t, yNF ) + a1F(t, yNF )− a0 = 0 (25a)
−2G2(t, xBA) + G˙(t, xBA) + a1G(t, xBA)− a0 = 0 (25b)
However, given that xBA, yNF ∈ Υ , throughout the mid auditing phase, F ,G
can be successfully approximated by the following equations:
F(t, yNF ) = α− 
(bA + )pI(t)(1 − yNF ) ≈ α (26a)
G(t, xBA) = −rF + rR(1− xBA) + pDpI(t)(1 − 
xBA) (26b)
≈ −rF + pDpI(t)
Substituting (26b)-(26c) into (25b)-(25b) and assuming F 	= G yields
a0 = −2α2 ++a1α = α(a1 − 2α) (27a)
a1 = −F˙ − G˙F − G + 2 (F + G) (27b)
(23) and (24) can be now written as a system of differential inequalities as
follows: [ V˙1
V˙2
]
≤
[
0 1
−a0 −a1
] [
V1
V2
]
(28)
Note that [V1(t, x∗BA, t∗NF ),V2(t, x∗BA, y∗NF )] = [0, 0] whereas V1 is local pos-
itive definite function. The conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied when the
roots of the characteristic equation s2 + a1s + a0 = 0 are both negative real
numbers. This holds when the following conditions are satisfied:
a0 = −2α2 + a1α = α(a1 − 2α) > 0 (29a)
a1 = −F˙ − G˙F − G + 2 (F + G) > 0 (29b)
Δ = a21 − 4a0 = a21 − 4a1α+ 8α2 > 0 (29c)
Optimal Auditing under Learning and Sympathy: A Game Theory Approach 17
Solving the above inequalities yields
a1 > 2α (30)
Thus, (30) is a sufficient condition for local asymptotical stability of the equi-
librium state (x∗BA = 1, y
∗
NF = 1).
Proposition 3 In the long run, the auditing/fraud detection game between
a less independent auditor and the client has a single pure strategy equilib-
rium that is (x∗BA, y
∗
NF ) = (1, 0). This equilibrium is asymptotically stable
in xBA, yNF ∈ Υ\{x∗BA, y∗NF} with Υ being a neighborhood region around
xBA = x
∗
BA, yNF = y
∗
NF .
Proof After long term presence of the auditor in the auditee firm (t → ∞)
it is observed that the best response of a less independent auditor (I∞ <
(rF − rR)/pD) to the strategies NF and F is BA, respectively, while the best
response of the client to the strategies BA and EA is F . Therefore, in long
term the game converges to (BA,F ). The same conclusion can be reached using
the mixed strategy equilibrium method. Specifically, both the auditor and the
client select their strategies in order to maximize (8a) and (8b), respectively.
However, after straightforward algebra yields:
∂uA
∂xBA
= −cBA + cEA > 0 (31a)
∂uC
∂yF
= rF − pDI∞ − rRxEA ≥ rF − rR − pDI∞ > 0 (31b)
From (31a)-(31b) it is readily obtained that uA and uC are a strictly increasing
functions of xBA and yF , respectively. Given that, 0 ≤ xBA, yF ≤ 1, their
maximum value is reached at (xBA, yF ) = (1, 1). Therefore, the equilibrium
point for auditing/fraud detection game between old engagement parties is
(x∗BA, x
∗
EA) = (1, 0) and (y
∗
NF , y
∗
F ) = (0, 1). To prove the stability of this
solution equilibrium point a similar approach to Proposition 2 is adopted. The
Lyapunov function for the system formed by (12a)-(12b) around (1, 0) is given
by:
V(t, xBA, yNF = δ1
(
xBA − x∗BA − x∗BA ln
(
xBA
x∗BA
))
+
1
2
δ2 (yNF − y∗NF )2
(32)
It is clear that V(t, x∗BA, y∗NF ) = 0 whereas V(t, xBA, yNF ) > 0 for all (xBA, yNF ) ∈
Υ with (xBA, yNF ) 	= (x∗BA, y∗NF ). It remains to be seen that V˙(t, xBA, yNF ) <
0 for all (xBA, yNF ) ∈ Υ with (xBA, yNF ) 	= (x∗BA, y∗NF ). After some algebraic
manipulations it can be easily shown that the time derivative of (32) is nega-
tive.
Proposition 4 In the long run, the auditing/fraud detection game between
an independent auditor and the client has a single pure strategy equilibrium
that is (x∗BA, y
∗
NF ) = (1, 1).
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.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
The phase diagram of the audit/fraud detection game for the case of an
independent and a less independent auditor is presented in Fig. 4a and 4b,
respectively. For the case where the auditor is not affected by sympathy, the
system in the long run will converge to the Nash Equilibrium point that at-
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tracts solutions from all initial conditions. However, in case of a less inde-
pendent auditor, throughout the mid phase the system will be attracted by
the xBA, yNF = (1, 1) whereas after a specific time threshold will converge to
xBA, yNF = (1, 0). This is explained by the fact that beyond this time thresh-
old the condition (30) is violated and the equilibrium point xBA, yNF = (1, 1)
becomes unstable (see Fig. 5).
5 Numerical Results and Discussions
5.1 Performance metric
At this point is should be mentioned that an important metric to be analyzed
is the probability of failed audit, PFA. An audit fails, if the client commits a
fraud and, due to self-serving bias, this incident is not appropriately reported
Bazerman et al., (1997). The following cases might occur:
- Case 1 (F ;BA;Non−Experienced): the auditor selects BA and his expe-
rience is not adequate to detect frauds. The probability this event to take
place is given by the following equation:
P1 = yFxBA (1− pE) (33)
- Case 2 (F ;BA;Experienced;Non − Independence) or (F ;EA;Non −
Independence): the auditor no matter what audit methodology will select,
frauds will be not reported since his opinion has been affected by his long
period presence (non-independence) in the auditee firm. This case appears
with probability given by:
P2 = yFxBApE (1− pI) + yFxEApE (1− pI) (34)
Based on (33), (34) the probability for an audit to fail is described through
the following equation:
PFA = yF · [xEA · (1− pI) + xBA (1− pE + pE (1− pI))] (35)
5.2 Results
So far, the fraud detection problem taking into account the impact of auditor’s
tenure on the quality of audit has been analyzed using game theory. In this
section, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the theoretical results.
Specifically, the evolution of the probability of failed audit over time is depicted
in Figure 6. In Figure 6a the case of a non independent auditor is examined
(I∞ → 0). It is observed that in the first two auditing periods the probability
of failed audit is reduced due to the increase of the auditor’s ability to detect
frauds. In the subsequent auditing period the auditee firm knows that even if
the financial statements are materially misstated as a result of fraud, then, this
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Fig. 6: Evolution of the probability of failed audit over time
action will be detected by the auditor. Therefore, the financial statements are
prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial
reporting framework. Unfortunately, after a few auditing periods, sympathy
may affect auditor’s professional independence and objectivity leading to an
increased probability of failed audit. On the other hand, if the ideal case of
an independent auditor is considered, then the learning effect has a favorable
impact on audit quality leading in the long run to zero probability of failed
audit (see Figure 6b).
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In Figure 6 it is also observed that the probability of failed audit is relatively
high (about 40% during the early stage of the audit process). However, in
practice, this probability should be kept below a specific threshold, P thFA, that
usually takes values in the range 5 − 7%. Thus, the payoffs of both players
should be selected in a way that satisfies the following inequality expressing
the quality of audit:
P ∗FA = yF · [xEA · (1− pI) + xBA (1− pE + pE (1− pI))] ≤ P thFA (36)
During the engagement of a new audit, the impact of sympathy on the audit
quality is negligible (PI → 1). Therefore, (36) may be successfully approxi-
mated by the following equation
P ∗FA = yF · xBA (1− pE) =
E0e
−αLt
(β/α+ 1)(γ/δ + 1)
≤ P thFA (37)
From (37) it is deduced that the equilibrium probability of failed audit is
an increasing function of α, δ, a decreasing function of β, γ and also decreases
with time. The contour plot of parameters α/β and δ/γ for different values
of P thFA is depicted in Figure 7. It is observed that a stricter threshold for the
probability of failed audit may be achieved by increasing the reward gained by
the auditor when a fraudulent report is detected or the bonus of the client when
the financial reports are free of material misstatements. Moreover, it is clear
that, given P thFA, a trade-off exists between α/β and δ/γ. It is also observed
from Figure 7 that the probabilities for the client to select NF and for the
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auditor EA increase with α/β and δ/γ, respectively. Therefore, it is deduced
that the more determined the auditor is to reveal fraud, the less probable is
for the client to commit a fraud. Finally, as deduced from Figure 8 with the
increase of the auditor’s tenure on the auditee firm, the same threshold for
the probability of failed audit may be achieved by reducing the reward gained
by the auditor when a fraudulent report is detected or the bonus of the client
when the financial reports are free of material misstatements.
So far, the risk assessment policy has been limited to audit procedures be-
tween two new engagement parts where the impact of sympathy is negligible.
Unfortunately, after long term audit engagements the quality of audit may
be significantly mitigated since the auditor’s actions are governed by sympa-
thy. In this case, the probability of failed audit is an increasing function of
Independence. To avoid this undesirable effect, replacement of the auditor is
required.
The optimal rotation time or different values of the auditor’s personal
characteristics is depicted in Figure 9. It is observed that the less independent
the auditor is the sooner should be replaced i.e. for large values of αI the
auditor, despite how experienced he is, should be replaced, at most, after
three auditing periods. On the contrary, an independent auditor with increased
knowledge acquisition skills should be replaced after a high number of auditing
periods (above 8).
Finally, in order to support the predictions of the proposed theoretical
model, the empirical data used in Fairchild et al., (2009) have been adopted.
Fairchild et al., (2009), identified instances of fraudulent financial reporting
by examining the gross number of qualified reports included in the FAME
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database for the time period 1995-2005. Their analysis has been carried out
taking into account the following conditions:
i. A company in order to be included in the sample must have a qualified
report in the final period of filing and 8-10 accounting years must be also
present.
ii. A company must have the same auditor for at least a 9 year period and at
least one Qualified report in that period.
From the overall sample, the authors in Fairchild et al., (2009) identified 684
companies satisfying the above criteria with mean tenure 5.62 years. In or-
der to integrate these empirical findings in the proposed scheme, it has been
assumed that the audit process concerning the companies included in FAME
database has been performed for an audit risk nominal level equal to 5%. Based
on this assumption, PFA can be empirically estimated through the fraction of
the number of non-qualified reports over the total number companies, multi-
plied by the audit risk level. The evolution of the probability of failed audit
over time, both for theoretical model and the empirical data is depicted in
Figure 10. It is observed that the curve describing the theoretical model is
very close to the empirical data with coefficient of determination, R2 = 0.971.
The theoretical model has been evaluated for I∞ = 0.141, αI = 0.054 and
αL = 0.285, where I
∞, αI and αL have been estimated using the well known
least squares fitting technique. As expected, during the early phase of the au-
dit process, PFA is reduced over time due to the client-specific learning effect.
However, after few auditing rounds, physiological effects lead to an increase of
the probability of failed audit.
6 Concluding Remarks
The paper studied the problem of fraud deterrence and detection in financial
reporting taking into consideration all the fundamental principles and threats
that may affect the performance of an audit process. In contrast to the exist-
ing schemes that segmentally studied the threats that could lead to a failed
audit, in the current approach, a novel scheme has been proposed based on
social psychology principles. The problem has been formulated and studied
using game theory. A unified model has been developed to jointly confront the
basic threats that are involved in an auditing process and provide reasonable
assurance for that the financial statements are free from material misstate-
ment. It has been proved that the auditing/fraud detection game between two
new engagement parties has unique mixed strategy equilibrium, between an
experienced auditor and a client has unique pure strategy equilibrium, whereas
between two old engagement parties the audit process switches to new pure
strategy equilibrium that is governed by sympathy. Finally, a closed form so-
lution for the optimal auditor’s period replacement has been extracted. The
validity of the proposed scheme was examined using empirical data. The results
obtained comply with the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants
that requires the key audit partner to be rotated after a predefined period.
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